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INDUSTRIAL COURTS ACT 1919

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY

Report of a Court of Inquiry under  
Professor John C. Wood, LL.M., into a  
Dispute between Pilkington Brothers Ltd.  
(and subsidiaries of that company) and  
certain of their employees

LONDON

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## INDUSTRIAL COURTS ACT 1919

### APPOINTMENT OF COURT OF INQUIRY AND RULES OF PROCEDURE

WHEREAS by the Industrial Courts Act 1919, the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity (hereafter referred to as "the Secretary of State") is empowered to refer any matters appearing to her to be connected with or relevant to a trade dispute, whether existing or apprehended, to a Court of Inquiry and to make rules regulating the procedure of any such Court;

AND WHEREAS a trade dispute exists between Pilkington Brothers Limited (and subsidiaries of that company) and certain of their employees.

NOW THEREFORE the Secretary of State by virtue of the powers vested in her by the Act and of all other powers enabling her in that behalf, appoints the following to constitute a Court of Inquiry;

Professor John C. Wood, LL M

M. J. M. Clarke, Esq.

J. Gormley, Esq., O BE

AND the Secretary of State directs that the terms of reference to the Court shall be as follows:—

"To inquire into the causes and circumstances of the dispute between Pilkington Brothers Limited (and subsidiaries of that company), and certain of their employees and of the strike which has caused stoppages of work at certain of the companies' plants, and to report."

AND the Secretary of State directs that the following rules regulating the procedure of the Court should have effect, that is to say:

1. (i) Any person may, by notice in writing signed by the Chairman of the Court, be required to attend as a witness and give evidence before the Court, or to attend and produce any documents relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry, or to furnish, in writing or otherwise as the Court may direct, such particulars in relation to the subject matter of the inquiry, as the Court may require;  
(ii) The Court may require any witness to give evidence on oath and the Chairman, or any person duly authorised by him, may administer an oath for that purpose;
2. The Court may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its number, and two members shall form a quorum;
3. The Court may at any time, if it thinks it expedient so to do, call in the aid of one or more Assessors specially qualified, for the purpose of assisting the Court in its inquiry;

4. The report and any interim report of the Court shall be made to the Secretary of State in writing, and shall be signed by such of the members as concur therein, and shall be transmitted to her as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the inquiry; and any minority report by any dissentient member of the Court shall be made and transmitted in like manner;

5. Subject to these rules the Court may regulate its own procedure as it thinks fit;

AND the Secretary of State further appoints Professor John C. Wood to be Chairman; and Mr. G. R. Fisher to be Secretary of the Court and Mr. M. R. Hanson to be Assistant Secretary of the Court.

SIGNED by Order of the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity this thirteenth day of May, 1970.

C. F. HERON  
Deputy Under-Secretary of State  
Department of Employment and Productivity.

# REPORT

To the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity:

MADAM,

1. We were appointed on 13th May, 1970, under the provisions of the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, with the following terms of reference:—

“To inquire into the causes and circumstances of the dispute between Pilkington Brothers Limited (and subsidiaries of that company), and certain of their employees and of the strike which has caused stoppages of work at certain of the companies' plants, and to report.”

2. In accordance with the terms of our appointment, we have the honour to submit the following Report.

## Introduction

3. The Court sat in public at the Municipal Annexe, Dale Street, Liverpool 2 on 19th and 21st May, 1970.

4. Written submissions were presented by Pilkington Brothers Ltd., and by the National Union of General and Municipal Workers.

5. The case for Pilkington Brothers Ltd. and their subsidiaries was presented by Mr. D. F. Pilkington, Director in charge of Industrial Relations. Mr. Pilkington was accompanied by Mr. G. W. T. Bird, Director, Mr. J. C. Montague, Works Manager, Sheet Works, St. Helens, Mr. W. H. Darlington, Personnel Co-ordinator, Flat Glass Division, Mr. P. Shepherdson, Manager, Management Services Department, and Mr. H. Foster, Deputy Group Industrial Relations Adviser. Evidence was also heard from Mr. G. H. Iley, Managing Director of the Triplex Safety Glass Company and Mr. T. R. Clayton, Leader of the Productivity Survey Team. The National Union of General and Municipal Workers was represented by Mr. D. Basnett, the National Industrial Officer, Mr. H. Norton, Secretary of the St. Helens branch, Mr. B. Willey, Research Assistant and Mr. H. Plumb, the Regional Officer responsible for St. Helens. Evidence was also heard from Mr. W. J. Bradburn, a shop steward at the St. Helens Sheet Works, Mr. J. McCormick and Mr. J. Considine, both shop stewards at the Cowley Hill Works, Mr. J. Beech, a shop steward at the Ravenhead Works, Mr. J. Peers, shop steward at the Triplex Works, Mr. T. Smee, shop steward at Fibreglass Limited, St. Helens, and Mr. L. Wells, a former regional officer of the Union. The Unofficial Strike Committee were represented by Mr. A. Casson, Solicitor, and their case was supported by evidence from Mr. G. A. Caughey, Chairman of the Committee and a shop steward at the Triplex Safety Glass Works, Eccleston, Mr. J. Potter, Treasurer of the Committee and a spout operator, Mr. W. Cowley, Secretary to the

Committee and a deputy shop steward, Mr. W. Graves, a chargehand at Fibreglass Limited, St. Helens, Mr. O. Hatton, a shop steward at the Flat Drawn Department, St. Helens and Mr. D. Greenhough, a member of the Unofficial Strike Committee who works at the Triplex factory.

6. We shall refer to Pilkington Brothers Limited and their subsidiaries as the Company throughout this Report and also use the following abbreviations:

GMWU—The National Union of General and Municipal Workers.

JIC—The Pilkington Glass Joint Industrial Council.

JIC Employees—Those employees of Pilkington Brothers Limited and their subsidiaries for whom pay, conditions of service and other matters affecting their employment are negotiated by the JIC.

## Part I

### BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE

7. The Pilkington Group of Companies has six plants in St. Helens and a number of plants in other parts of the country, including Birkenhead, Doncaster, Queenborough, Pontypool, St. Asaph and Glasgow. The parent company is Pilkington Brothers Limited, and the remainder of the Group consists of the following subsidiaries:—

Pilkington Brothers (South Wales) Limited.  
Pilkington Brothers (Queenborough) Limited.  
Fibreglass Limited.  
Chance Pilkington Optical Limited.  
Pilkington Perkin Elmer Limited.  
Triplex Safety Glass Company Limited.  
Chance Brothers Limited.

8. The Group is engaged in the manufacture of glass of many varieties, from sheet glass to optical glass. The Group, through the Triplex Company, is the main supplier of safety glass to vehicle manufacturers: this supply represents a substantial proportion of the Group's output.

9. Glass-making is a continuous process (168 hours per week) and the furnaces in the sections are important manufacturing units, containing up to 2,000 tons of molten glass. Once these furnaces are lit, they normally continue in operation for some years before needing major repairs. If it is necessary to cool a furnace for major repair, it is some weeks at least before the furnace can be re-established as a glass-making unit. Some repairs can, however, be carried out when the furnace is hot, although the production of glass may have to cease while the repairs are being performed.

10. Before the dispute started the group had some 25,400 employees in the United Kingdom, of whom 16,700 were in St. Helens. 15,600 of these employees (11,000 in St. Helens) were hourly paid; these numbers included 11,300 process workers (9,200 in St. Helens), for whom pay and conditions were negotiated by the JIC.

11. The 11,300 process workers are represented by the GMWU. Under the terms of an agreement between the Company and the Union, it is obligatory for all workers who started work with the Company in JIC jobs after October, 1964, to join the GMWU and for those in the Union to remain members of it.

12. The JIC was founded in 1918 and its membership consists of 22 company representatives, 7 full-time GMWU officials, 15 elected employees and a secretary. It negotiates wages, hours and working conditions for work-people represented by the GMWU and is responsible for seeking means to settle disputes which have not been resolved by the parties directly concerned.

Wage negotiations are centralised through the JIC, which also controls bonus levels; nevertheless, within the overriding agreements of the JIC, there is some negotiation at works level.

13. GMWU members are organised in one branch in St. Helens, No. 91, and are represented on the shop floor by elected shop stewards or deputy shop stewards, of whom there were at the outset of the dispute some 120 in the St. Helens' plants (about one steward or deputy steward for every 53 JIC workers). Shop stewards are responsible, among other things, for dealing with complaints which they may refer to the foreman/supervisor or departmental manager or through the branch secretary to the district organiser of the GMWU. Complaints and disputes which cannot be resolved in this way may be referred by the works manager or GMWU district organiser to the JIC. Reference of complaints to shop stewards is not obligatory and workpeople may take them up with their foreman/supervisor or personnel officer.

14. The wage structure is complicated. The reasons for this are partly historical and partly related to the nature of the process and its continuous character. Since 1933, many types of individual and group bonus schemes have been introduced. Bonuses may be related to personal output ("direct system workers") or geared to the performance of the direct operator ("indirect system workers"). Other bonuses are not tied to base rate or time, but are negotiated for groups of workpeople on the basis of a number of factors related to the process ("group multi-factor bonuses"). Yet another type of bonus is fixed in return for employees fulfilling a measured quantity of work ("measured day work"). As processes become increasingly machine-controlled, multi-factor bonuses apply to more people. Payments are also made for overtime and shift work and these take the form of added hours. In October, 1969, some 90% of JIC employees were on some form of bonus payment. A Job Evaluation Scheme was introduced about 12 years ago, and so far approximately 75% of jobs have been evaluated.

15. In 1968, an agreement was reached in the JIC which had the effect of increasing base rates, with a compensating reduction in bonus wherever possible. The Agreement increased all base rates as from 3rd August, 1968, by 12½%, the increase being applied to base rates paid for hours worked, added time and shift supplements. Since the 12½% increase in earnings for hours worked was offset by a bonus reduction which varied according to the amount of bonus in payment, the effects of the change in base rates varied considerably. The earnings of some employees increased by up to 12½% but others, for example the day workers whose bonus was more than 12½% and were not working overtime, received no increase in earnings. The Agreement also provided for a further increase in base rates from 2nd November, 1968, amounting to 6s. 8d. for 40 hours for adult male employees. The effect of the two increases was to raise the basic rate for adult male workers from £10 18s. 4d. to £12 12s. 4d. for 40 hours.

16. The GMWU re-opened negotiations with the Company in July, 1969, with a claim for a basic minimum of £15 0s. 0d. a week. Eventually a two-part increase was agreed for application to pay, hours and related bonuses. The first part increased base rates for all adult male and female workers by 13s. 4d. for 40 hours, raising the basic 40-hour rate to £13 5s. 8d. for adult male employees.

A minimum earnings level of £14 10s. 0d. was established for men who worked not less than 40 hours and such reasonable overtime as might be required. An improvement in shift payments was also agreed. The second part of the Agreement increased base rates by 11s. 8d. for 40 hours from 2nd May, 1970, to a basic rate for adult male workers of £13 17s. 4d. a week. At the same time the minimum earnings level applied to adult male workers for a 40-hour week was increased to £15 0s. 0d.

17. During the periods when glass furnaces are under repair, the earnings of process workers on these furnaces may be reduced. Since 1942 there has been provision for some cushioning of these reductions by the payment of special allowances (known as "make-up") for a limited period. On 5th March, 1970, following a threatened stoppage of work in the Sheet Works, a special meeting of the Executive Committee of the JIC was held to reconsider the payments which were being made to employees working on a furnace repair in that works. At this meeting it was agreed that during furnace repairs the make-up on base rates would be increased from 9d. an hour to 1s. 0d. an hour and the make-up on bonus from 9d. an hour to 1s. 6d. an hour. On 20th March, 1970, it was agreed to set up a special sub-committee of the JIC Executive Committee to examine the whole question of payments to be made during furnace repairs.

18. An incorrect interpretation of the new agreement on payment during furnace repairs, by the wages office, led to a number of over-payments and under-payments of wages, affecting 136 men. Following a complaint about these errors, and although meetings were taking place to discuss them, some 45 men stopped work in the Sheet Works, St. Helens, on 3rd April, 1970. At a meeting held at the Sheet Works at 3.00 p.m. on that day, between representatives of the Company, of the GMWU and of the workers, the complaint was discussed and a promise was made that the errors would be remedied. At this meeting a demand was made for a consolidation of bonus or an increase of 2s. 6d. an hour on the base rate. During the afternoon the strike spread to other parts of the factory and at a further meeting at 6.30 p.m. on 3rd April, GMWU officials informed the Company that the men had decided to go on strike for 2s. 6d. an hour. This demand was subsequently amended to £10 0s. 0d. a week on the basic rate.

19. During the next few days the strike spread to six of the Company's factories in St. Helens and seven elsewhere. One factory, at Queenborough, was unaffected throughout. Following the stoppage a special meeting of the JIC was called, for 13th April, 1970, when an official claim was made for a wage increase, a review of the wages structure, and a review of negotiating procedures. The Company replied that it would not make an offer until the employees returned to work. At a further meeting held on 17th April, 1970, the GMWU asked for a firm offer as a basis for a return to work. The Company promised to improve the increase due to be paid from 2nd May, 1970, as an interim measure, if there was a return to work before 21st April. Between the 17th and 20th April, discussions took place which included consultation with the manpower advisers of the Department of Employment and Productivity. On the 20th April, the Company offered £3 0s. 0d. a week to be added to the gross earnings of all employees over 18 years of age with reduced increases for those below that age. This would be paid for 40 hours' work or more

and would be additional to the increase already agreed from 2nd May. The £3 0s. 0d. would not be included in basic pay but would raise the minimum earnings level for adult male employees from £15 0s. 0d. to £18 0s. 0d. a week. The Company also agreed to the setting up of two joint working parties immediately, one to examine the wages structure and the other, negotiating procedures. The JIC agreed to recommend a return to work on the basis of the offer. On the 22nd April, the National Executive Committee of the GMWU approved the Agreement and recommended a return to work.

20. The JIC Agreement was accepted by all the factories located outside St. Helens and they had returned to work by the 27th April, 1970. In St. Helens a meeting of shop stewards was held on 21st April to discuss the Agreement. Following this meeting a mass meeting was held at which the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the strike. This was also true of a number of mass meetings called later by the Unofficial Strike Committee which had been set up in St. Helens. The GMWU also organised a number of meetings at various factories in order to recommend a return to work. These GMWU efforts resulted in a partial return to work early in May which was not, however, sustained following disturbances between employees returning to and leaving work and pickets at the factory gates. The GMWU decided to give financial assistance to members affected by the dispute on the basis of £12 0s. 0d. to full members and £6 0s. 0d. to "half" members.

21. During the strike, the GMWU made two attempts to obtain the views of its members on the question of a return to work, by means of ballots. The first of these was a Company-wide postal ballot held in mid-April, before the JIC agreement of 20th April. The results were not announced. The second ballot was held on 16th May, 1970, in St. Helens only. The Unofficial Strike Committee agreed to co-operate in this ballot to ensure that only those entitled to vote should do so, and it was also agreed that the ballot should be held under the supervision of local clergymen who were prepared to act as scrutineers. It was agreed by all parties that they would stand by the results of the ballot. There were 6,246 votes cast in this ballot, the declared result being a majority of 274 in favour of a return to work. The Unofficial Strike Committee were not, however, prepared to recommend a return to work on the strength of this ballot and their Chairman expressed doubts about its validity. Following the ballot there was, however, a partial return to work on Monday, 18th May, although the majority of the process workers in St. Helens remained on strike. This was the situation at the opening of the Court of Inquiry, the setting up of which had been announced by the Secretary of State on 9th May.

## Part II

### THE MAIN CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

#### The Company

22. The Company said that it enjoyed a long history of good relations with its employees. The Company had pioneered many social benefits and amenities for its staff. It had been early to recognise Trades Unions and the principles of joint consultation and collective bargaining, and had been relatively free of industrial disputes. This dispute was not one between the Company and the GMWU, but between the Company and certain of its employees. It was the Company's belief that the cause of the strike was more fundamental than the comparatively minor matter of the miscalculation of bonus rates for furnace repair affecting 136 men, a matter which had been adequately dealt with in itself. The Company noted that on 20th March, 1970, the JIC Executive Committee had agreed to set up a special sub-committee to consider the problem of earnings during furnace repair.

23. There had been criticism of the Company's low wages. At the start of the strike, the basic rate was £13 5s. 8d. for 40 hours and there was a minimum earnings level of £14 10s. 0d. for men who had worked not less than 40 hours per week. The Company agreed that the basic rates compared unfavourably with other industries, but said that with bonus earnings, extras paid in overtime and shift supplements, etc., the average weekly earnings for adult male employees compared most favourably with those paid by many leading companies. Indeed, a comparison of the JIC average earnings and those of other industries for the second pay week in October, 1969, showed the JIC fourth in the table of earnings. From 2nd May, 1970, the basic rate was increased to £13 17s. 4d. and the minimum earnings level became £15 0s. 0d. The effect of the interim offer of £3 0s. 0d. was to raise the minimum earnings for men who had completed 40 hours to £18 0s. 0d. per week. The Company estimated that after 2nd May, 1970, the average earnings of JIC workers would have been £33 0s. 0d. per week, or just under 25% more than in October, 1969, assuming that the hours worked would have been similar to those worked during the week prior to the strike. In October, 1969, the average hours worked by JIC adult male employees was 46.8 per week, which compared with an all-industry average of 46.5 hours at that time.

24. Even in 1968, the Company had recognised the need to amend the wage structure. The span between maximum and minimum earnings was too large: bonus earnings were getting out of balance with total earnings: the disparity of pay treatment between shift and day workers had resulted in a large turnover of shift workers, and the application of wage increases was inequitable as the resultant earnings varied substantially, depending on the job conditions. The Company believed that the most effective way to make improvements in the short-term, was to build up the base rates and reduce bonus earnings. In wage negotiations with the Union it had attempted to do this. In July, 1968, it had been successful and the JIC had agreed to raise

the basic rate with bonus offsets. A similar scheme submitted to the JIC in 1969 was unacceptable to the Union side. The Company maintained that this attitude of the Union in opposing adjustments designed to rationalise the wage structure had hindered progress.

25. The Company said that it could have made more rapid changes in the wages structure, but believed it essential to study in depth the implications of any revision on the Company structure as a whole. In July, 1968, a team of managers was appointed to do this but it became obvious that changes in the wages structure could not be made in isolation. In July, 1969, the "Productivity Programme" was launched, the object of which was to study ways of increasing the productivity of the Group in order to achieve the most economical utilisation of its resources and to bring about those changes in the working environment and attitudes at all levels, which would be necessary if benefits to both the employees and the Company were to be lasting. One of the stated aims of the programme was: "The establishment of a wages and salaries structure which is fair and equitable to all employees." The objects of the programme were communicated to all employees in July, 1969, at meetings and by the distribution of printed cards. The Company's proposals in negotiations and its long-term planning were evidence of its sensitivity to the need to amend the wages structure, and its agreement to the establishment of a working party to look into the problem on 20th April, 1970 was a further indication of this. Looking to the future, the Company outlined its idea of an improved wage structure. This would include a basic weekly wage, skill differentials and the amending of the Job Evaluation Scheme to achieve fewer and larger steps, compensation for social inconvenience and an incentive bonus element.

26. The Company was aware that the negotiating structure would benefit from changes, particularly in the development of a JIC substructure, and this need had been apparent for some time, particularly in the large St. Helens' complex. Here, size made the negotiations, consultations and communications more difficult. The Company's record of negotiating procedures was, however, a good one. The main negotiating body, the JIC, had set examples to other industries and the Shop Stewards' Charter was regarded as a model. On this foundation the Company hoped to develop, and looked to the working parties to be set up following 20th April Agreement to help in this. Consultative meetings at departmental level in some individual works had proved valuable. At each of the factories where work had been resumed following the strike, working parties had already been established to look into the negotiating structures. Other ventures were being introduced, such as the works consultative committees, made up of representatives of all employees: process workers, craftsmen, staff, etc.

27. The actual conduct of the strike gave the Company cause for concern. The initial dispute was a minor matter adequately resolved through the normal channels of negotiations. The walk-off was a flagrant breach of the rules and a disregard of safety regulations. The Company had not received any demand for an increase in wages before the dispute, but following the walk-off there was an official claim for 2s. 6d. an hour, amended to £5 0s. 0d. and then £10 0s. 0d. a week on base rates. The forcing out on strike of other employees by a show of numbers; the failure to follow the recognised procedure for dealing with the dispute and the failure to honour the JIC Agreement of 20th April,

that there should be a return to work, were equally disturbing factors. The Company condemned the intimidation of employees who returned to work by pickets and the violence which had accompanied the strike.

28. The Company regretted the strike because of the atmosphere it had engendered, its repercussions on other industries and for its deleterious effect on the Company's trading position and the subsequent threat to jobs. The Company estimated that there would be a long-term reduction in overall demand for safety glass of at least 15%. The Company hoped that a more calm and unemotional atmosphere would quickly prevail so that the Company and the Union could get down to the task<sup>t</sup> of building a more satisfactory future.

### The Union

29. The Union repudiated criticisms that it had not advanced the interests of its membership. The Agreement negotiated through the JIC on 20th April, 1970, supplementing the Agreement of September, 1969, was, by any test or standard, a good one. The 1969 Agreement provided for wage increases of about 10% for day workers, rising to 20% for shift workers and established a minimum earnings level of £15 0s. 0d. for a 40-hour week. This had been well received in all the Union's branches and no application had been made to amend, supplement or substitute it. The Agreement of April, 1970, added £3 0s. 0d. to the gross earnings of all employees. The combined effects of these two Agreements was to give a minimum earnings level of £18 0s. 0d. per week and it was estimated that the average weekly earnings for adult male JIC employees would now be £33 0s. 0d. per week, compared to £26 0s. 0d. for the preceding October. The Union gave examples of the wage increases which would result from the two Agreements. The lowest adult male rate for day workers would increase by £5 7s. 8d. for 40 hours worked. A day worker on "system" would be £4 17s. 1d. per week better off for 40 hours worked; a carrier on shift work would get an increase of £6 8s. 8d. (bonus excluded) and a cut-off man on shift work, £7 11s. 11d. (bonus excluded). Moreover, the flat supplement of £3 0s. 0d. was payable both to men and women and between October, 1969, and May, 1970, the lowest female rate for a 40-hour week had risen by £4 5s. 0d.

30. The acceptance of the £3 0s. 0d. on gross earnings had been criticised. It was the maximum which could be negotiated and was of special benefit to the lowest paid workers; an addition to base rates would have produced varying results and accentuated the inherent weaknesses of the pay structure. The Union stressed that the 1970 Agreement did not only result in short-term financial gains. The setting up of the working parties to examine wages and negotiating procedures would necessarily involve the consideration of the long-term needs of the Union membership. The Agreement had received the unanimous support of the Trade Union side of the JIC; it had been accepted by a meeting of shop stewards; it had been accepted by all factories outside St. Helens and had been approved by the National Executive of the GMWU. Submissions about changes in the wage structure voiced by the Unofficial Committee came only after negotiations had been concluded on the 1969 Agreement.

31. The Union felt that the causes of the dispute were deep-rooted. The Union's National Officer had assumed responsibility for the industry only a short time ago, but at a meeting in March, 1970, he had warned the Company that there were problems which needed immediate attention and which could not be put off until the Company had concluded its own long-term investigations. These problems were of long standing and had caused friction for a number of years. Despite these warnings, the Company had failed to anticipate the problems underlying the strike.

32. The Company's wage structure was a source of friction. The base rates were too low and no doubt in the context of the current wages explosion, workers were particularly concerned about their comparability with other industries. Fluctuating bonus schemes did not give a stable wage: base rate increases were subject to different multipliers for various groups and produced different results, and differentials in shift-working resulted in anomalies.

33. The negotiating procedures at Pilkingtons failed to involve shop stewards to a sufficient degree and the lack of JIC substructure precluded the involvement of workpeople in discussions. The negotiating system was too centralised and divorced from the conditions and feelings of local works, and in future the negotiating structure would need to reflect a greater degree of autonomy at factory level.

34. The Company was at fault in not involving people at an early stage of planning, for example, in the Productivity Programme. This reflected the patriarchal style of the Company's industrial relations policy.

35. The Union branch No. 91 at St. Helens contained 7,400 members and the Union accepted that the organisation of the branch may not have been fully appropriate to the needs of the situation, and announced that an inquiry by its National Executive was being instituted. Notwithstanding, many of the complaints which had been voiced since the start of the dispute had not been raised previously at Union meetings. Allegations that shop stewards were not elected were unfounded; and it was possible for lay members to attend branch meetings.

36. The Union believed that particular factors influenced the situation in St. Helens. The strike had been declared official at branch level in St. Helens at an early stage. But the National Executive who were required to endorse this decision decided not to do so and the strike remained unofficial. This created confusion and a belief that there was a question of strike pay involved. The Union felt that it had not been able to communicate with its membership effectively. Mass meetings were not the most appropriate settings for discussing detailed arrangements. People not involved in the dispute could attend and a crowd might be easily manipulated. Damage to the Union's offices in St. Helens had made these unusable as a communications centre. The formation of the Unofficial Strike Committee led to further confusion. The Committee started to issue propaganda and claimed to be the only body which could negotiate for the Pilkington strikers, and worked against a return to work on any terms but its own. The Union gave three examples of the confusion caused by the Committee: the shop stewards' meeting to discuss the JIC Agreement of 20th April, the mass meeting following, and the ballot of 16th May.

37. On 21st April a meeting of shop stewards had been called to discuss the JIC Agreement. Union officials had no doubt that there was a very clear majority in favour of accepting the Agreement and recommending this to the strikers as a basis for a return to work. The Unofficial Strike Committee interpreted the results of this meeting differently and confusion ensued. An unofficial mass meeting had been organised for the afternoon. This meeting was declared official but despite an undertaking by the strike leaders that the Union's National Officer would have an opportunity to put his case, he could not gain a hearing. The fact that the terms of the JIC Agreement and the Company's interim offer could not be communicated at the mass meeting, and that the Union official could not put forward his reasons for recommending a return to work, not only weakened the Union's position, but prevented a discussion of the issues at stake. On 16th May a ballot was conducted jointly by officials of the Union and members of the Unofficial Strike Committee with St. Helen's clergy assisting. There were accusations that the Union did not fully co-operate with the Unofficial Strike Committee in meeting all its demands in ascertaining the eligibility of some of the voters to participate in the ballot. These accusations were used by the Unofficial Strike Committee not only to cast doubts on the validity of the ballot but were used by them as the reason for not recommending a return to work, despite the majority decision in favour of ending the strike and the pledge that the result would be respected. The Union maintained that the ballot was impartial and fair and that every opportunity had been afforded to the Unofficial Strike Committee to challenge the result or the procedures, by the Vicar of St. Helens, but they had not done so. Indeed, their objections were voiced only some time after the count had been concluded.

38. The Union deplored the violence which had accompanied the strike. The Union believed that it was right to honour existing agreements and agreed procedures. The dispute had brought many problems into the open but it looked to the resumption of normal working, when it would again be possible for the Union to get on with its job of negotiating for a harmonious future.

#### **The Unofficial Strike Committee**

39. It was explained that the Unofficial Strike Committee consisted of 25 members, democratically elected, including one shop steward and one shop floor representative from each of the six factories in St. Helens. All were members of the GMWU and employees of the Pilkington Group; many had a very long record of service with the Group and approximately 15 or 16 members of the Committee were shop stewards.

40. The error that triggered off the dispute was a minor matter affecting a very small group of men.

41. The wage machinery, with its multiplicity of wage systems and the complications of bonus schemes, was unwieldy and must be improved. The Committee acknowledged that if there was to be a substantial increase in earnings, productivity would have to be investigated. Management steps to investigate productivity had come late in the day, bearing in mind the long history of the Group.

42. There was discontent with the low basic pay. Other industries had far higher basic rates. Pilkington workers had to put in many hours of overtime and to work in unpleasant and sometimes unsafe conditions, or on piece-work, in order to maintain reasonable living standards. Variations in earnings during tank repairs were a particular source of complaint. Individuals felt that the Company had made exaggerated claims about the levels of earnings for its workpeople.

43. The process workers all belong to a single union. The discontent about wages and conditions was well known to this Union but little had been achieved to resolve the causes of complaint. The GMWU had not negotiated effectively.

44. Members were deeply disturbed by the lack of communication within the Union. Branch meetings, for example, were attended by only a handful of members, because it was widely accepted that these were restricted to shop stewards. The minutes of branch meetings were never circulated to members. It was conceded that in many cases shop stewards were properly elected, but it was argued that in isolated instances elections had not been held and other shop stewards had not been democratically elected. There was no link-up between men at work and the branch meeting. The Union members were not directly involved in wage negotiations, and wished to participate more fully in decision making. Members had felt alienated from the Union because it was alleged that the Union tended to dictate rather than reflect the views of its membership. The GMWU seemed content with the situation in St. Helens and reluctant to introduce changes. All this had led to discontent and loss of tempers.

45. The JIC Agreement of 20th April was unacceptable in that the £3 increase was not added to base rates. It was argued that acceptance of this Agreement could only be decided by the workpeople, and not by the shop stewards on their behalf. The meeting of the shop stewards called to discuss the JIC Agreement had agreed to ask the mass meeting whether to accept it. An undertaking had been given that no attempt would be made to influence the meeting and that the National Officer of the Union would be given the opportunity to present the Agreement without interference. This undertaking had been kept.

46. There had been conflicting reports about the mass meetings. It was clear, however, that large numbers of strikers had attended these meetings and had been firmly behind the Committee. The unsatisfactory nature of the Union's communications had made many of its members so distrustful that they were not prepared to listen to union officers at mass meetings. This was a spontaneous response from a mass of dissatisfied members.

47. The Unofficial Strike Committee had participated in the ballot on 16th May, 1970. Members of the Committee had agreed the names entered on the list of voters, but later they expressed doubts about the validity of the ballot, because it was believed that new members had been signed on by the GMWU shortly before the ballot was held and had voted, and because the GMWU did not agree to recheck all names on ballot lists against ballot papers issued, and to a check of lists against branch records. Until such a check was carried out the Committee were dubious about accepting some 300 people

whose names had been entered on a supplementary list and who had then voted, but who had not appeared on the main voting lists. This matter had been raised with an official of the GMWU after the count of votes had been completed but without result. There was, however, no complaint about the way in which the clergymen conducted the ballot.

48. They felt that a gulf existed between shop floor and management. It was difficult to pinpoint this, but there was a feeling that management was unconcerned about the problems and complaints of workpeople despite the machinery that existed to deal with these matters. In practice the arrangements by management to supply rulings and information and to solve problems were not effective.

49. The Unofficial Strike Committee wished to make it clear that they deplored all violence and intimidation from whatever quarter it might have come. They felt that many of their principal contentions were accepted by management and union. There was a wide area of agreement and it was the wish of the Committee that a formula should be found very quickly for healing the breach that now existed.

## Part III

### THE VIEWS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY

#### A. The Strike

50. It immediately became obvious to us that the strike had several important underlying causes. The apparent cause of the strike on 3rd April is itself of little significance. Ostensibly it arose because of miscalculations of payment due to workers during furnace repairs. The affected workers, 45 at Sheet Works, St. Helens went on strike. It is interesting to note that an analysis given to us by the Company showed that 33 of these men had less than one year's service. Had the miscalculation been the sole source of trouble it is likely that the machinery available would have been effective in curing the trouble. But the miscalculation was by no means all that was wrong for the strike spread rapidly—to all other St. Helens works within two days and to six works outside St. Helens within a further three days. Triplex, Glasgow joined the strike some days later.

51. There was a quick change in the basis of the strike on the very first day. The Company was told by the shop stewards later in the day that there was a demand for consolidation of bonus or for 2s. 6d. per hour. This amount was quickly doubled to £10 per week. This wages demand has to be considered against the background of the wages position. There had been a settlement in the JIC on 25th September, 1969. This provided an increase of 13s. 4d. for adult males on base rates. It was to be followed by a further increase of 11s. 8d. on 2nd May, 1970. Thus the strike and consequent wage claim came in the middle of an existing agreement, a few weeks before the second instalment came into effect.

52. Nonetheless efforts were made by the Company and the GMWU to settle the strike. Although the Company had taken up the usual position and refused to negotiate whilst men were on strike the JIC in fact met and an agreement was reached on 20th April "in order to obtain a return to work at the earliest possible moment." The offer had three parts:—

- (1) £3 to all JIC workers aged 18 years or over to be added to gross earnings with a proportionate increase for juveniles.
- (2) The setting up immediately of a working party to examine the wages structure.
- (3) The setting up immediately of a second working party to examine negotiating procedures.

The result of this Agreement was to secure a minimum earnings level of £18 and average earnings, according to the Company, of £33 per week.

53. Although the acceptability of this offer was not properly tested until the ballot on 16th May, the fact that it was not acceptable to a substantial

proportion of those on strike at St. Helens is a significant pointer to the underlying problems. The increase and promised review were not sufficient to secure a full return to work although it is significant that all the factories outside St. Helens accepted the proposals and ended their strike. There can be no doubt that the wages structure had caused widespread discontent. Two questions arise—To what extent was the wages structure defective? and Why did the strike continue at St. Helens? We will consider the problems of the wages structure when we turn to the underlying problems. The second question can only be answered by following the course of the strike.

54. We accept the view of the Union that the JIC Agreement of 20th April was a good one. It both raised gross earnings and provided a certain amount of flexibility for the review of the wages structure promised. This flexibility, it was felt, was necessary before a permanent solution to the wages anomalies could be negotiated. The JIC Agreement was put to a branch meeting of shop stewards on 21st April and it is at this stage that real confusion and lack of unity began. The meeting was attended by well over 100 shop stewards and a motion was passed the exact terms of which are not too clear. It was apparently a composite motion approving the JIC Agreement and also agreeing that the terms should be put to a mass meeting called for that afternoon. There can be no doubt that a large majority of the shop stewards were in favour of accepting the offer. But for some the matter did not end there. They wished to explore the attitude of a mass meeting of workers and they were not willing to express support for the acceptance agreed by the majority of shop stewards.

55. It is pertinent to comment here on the differing attitudes to decision making. Those supporting the Union looked for decisions taken within the Union machinery. If, for example, a decision by the body of shop stewards was to be put to a mass meeting of the workers it was their view that it should be supported by all shop stewards. A group, however, felt that decision making should lie with the whole body of workers and to them the decisions of a mass meeting were of supreme importance. They did nothing to attempt to persuade the workers to return to work despite the earlier decision of the shop stewards. Indeed they rejected totally the idea that the mass meeting should be led in any direction.

Several points emerge:

- (1) The past weaknesses of the Union organisation at branch level meant that loyal support for the Union and acceptance of majority decisions made in the lawfully constituted Union machinery was not forthcoming as strongly as it should have been.
- (2) The use of the open air mass meeting as the principal organ of decision making proved unsatisfactory and disruptive. Those with arguments to put often felt that they were denied a fair hearing and rowdy elements in the crowd, perhaps intent on disturbing the meeting, had played too great an effect on the decision reached.
- (3) The result was inevitably confusion, lines of communication broke down and it was difficult to obtain an accurate reflection of views

held. This is clear from a comparison of votes at mass meetings in favour of a continued strike and the result of the ballot of 16th May, which favoured a return to work.

56. It is only necessary to look briefly at the meeting of 21st April. It was held in the open air with poor public address facilities, there was no check on the Union membership of those attending and it was far from orderly. Although unwisely designated as official on that day it was still run by the group of workers who possibly opposed the Agreement to be put to the meeting. The meeting rejected the Agreement and overwhelmingly resolved to remain on strike. From then onwards there was confusion and bitterness. Confusion was caused by many factors and regrettably led to a breakdown in communications between the Union and its members: bitterness by the feeling that the Agreement of 20th April had not been properly judged on the one hand and the feeling that the Union was failing in its leadership on the other. Strong picketing of factories was organised by those opposed to the settlement and the whole atmosphere was charged with ill-feeling and violence. All who appeared before us strongly condemned this violence. It was, however, the almost inevitable result of the rejection of established Union procedures and the active prosecution of a formidable factory gate show of strength against those who had accepted the 20th April Agreement.

57. No purpose would be served in commenting further on the conduct of the strike. Its character had been set and it continued to produce unhappy incidents. The most significant event without doubt was the ballot arranged and held on 16th May. An earlier ballot had been held by the Union. It had been announced on 13th April and was held under the auspices of the Electoral Reform Society before the interim offer of 20th April. It was a Company-wide ballot as at that stage factories throughout the country were on strike. The result was surprisingly never announced. The common assumption is that it favoured a continuance of the strike. The second ballot held on 16th May after the interim offer, was supervised by the clergy of St. Helens, led by the Vicar. It was run on the lines of a municipal election and was a jointly organised affair between the Union and the Unofficial Strike Committee. The result showed a majority for a return to work of 274.

58. We heard a great deal of evidence about this ballot because of the refusal of the Unofficial Strike Committee to accept its verdict and support the majority decision, a narrow one albeit, and support a return to work. Because of all that was said at the hearing we feel we should make three comments:

- (1) Every effort was made before the ballot to meet the wishes of the Unofficial Strike Committee. Great pains were taken to ensure that the ballot was run fairly and efficiently.
- (2) The ballot itself was supervised by the clergy and was watched by six scrutineers from the Union and six from the Unofficial Strike Committee. The ballot closed at five in the evening and within an hour and a half the Vicar of St. Helens was able to announce the result to the scrutineers. He made a particular point of asking if they were satisfied with the conduct of the ballot and with the figures he had just given. All 12 scrutineers agreed that they were.

(3) Before the result was publicly announced the Unofficial Strike Committee scrutineers had expressed to one of the Union officials two grounds for complaint. One related to the failure to allow a check between the Union branch register and the voting list. The other related to a number of names of persons allowed to vote who were not on the voters' list. This list had been in the control of two scrutineers, one from each side and every name noted had been jointly agreed. The Union official rejected these arguments and no formal complaint was made to the Vicar who announced the figures as arranged at 9.00 p.m.

Some significance was attached to the fact that the list of those allowed to vote, but not thought to be on the voting list, numbered about 300, more than the majority. Indeed the Unofficial Strike Committee repudiated the ballot. This decision was contrary to the promise made by their Chairman that the result would be accepted however narrow the majority.

59. This decision deserves the strongest criticism. Every effort had been made to ensure a fair ballot, the Strike Committee's wishes had been met in every respect except one—checking the voting list with the branch records. The Union seemed to think the branch records inferior to those of the Company and so could not accept this procedure. Certainly it was not pressed as a point of major importance before the result of the ballot was known, and the same list was used just previously for the distribution of hardship pay by the Union. The record of those who were thought not to be on the voting lists but who were allowed to vote has in fact some 313 names. This record is a list of agreed names, the result of acceptance as entitled to vote by a scrutineer from the Union and one from the Unofficial Strike Committee. All names on the list were there by agreement. Many of the names there are those of voters on the lists whose right to vote should never have been queried had a careful search of the voting lists been possible. There were at least 70 of these. Two points are clear. The ballot was properly and well conducted and indeed no formal protest was ever made to the Vicar of St. Helens, who was acting as Returning Officer, or indeed to anyone until the result was known, nor apparently considered until the result was known. The actions of those who rejected the findings of the ballot show that their judgment of democratic reality had been blunted by their enthusiasm for a particular viewpoint. We consider that a well-run ballot had a useful role to play in a dispute of this kind, and should have resulted in an immediate return to work.

60. The strike ended shortly after we finished our public hearing. The delay after the announcement of the result of the ballot reflects strongly against those who had previously maintained an attitude based on the support of mass meetings. Although they acted unconstitutionally their efforts accurately reflected the general dissatisfaction in St. Helens: their lack of mature judgment and sound leadership is strongly to be deplored.

## B. Underlying Causes

### (i) *The Wage Structure*

61. It was said on behalf of those who persisted in the strike that the fundamental issue was money. If this is meant to indicate that wages were low we cannot entirely agree. Certainly by the 20th April the offered settlement

gave minimum earnings for an adult male worker of £18 and an average, according to the Company, of £33. These rates compare very favourably with similar industries and with earnings in the area.

62. But everyone agreed that the structure was such as to cause a great number of anomalies and points of tension. The most serious weakness had been that the base rate was too low. This in turn meant that bonuses played too large a part in the make up of wages. Too large a proportion of earnings depended on overtime and bonus pay. There had been a Job Evaluation Scheme for 12 years but 25% of jobs have not been evaluated. Those that have been evaluated are on very small steps of 1d. per hour which fail to give big enough differentials between jobs on the same payment/shift system. The jobs not evaluated may have unbelievably small steps some as small as .01d. and there are about 100 of them. Such complexity plainly cannot be justified. The bonus system itself has reached a position where overhaul is essential. Bonuses aimed at producing 30% of the wage are by now in many instances producing as much as 60%. Such bonuses produce great anomalies as does the existence side by side of different wage systems—day rate, direct, indirect and fixed bonus.

63. Some of the features of the jobs themselves produce difficulties that in turn lead easily to discontent. A prime example is the problem of tank repair. Work on repair is provided but wages fluctuate. Wages earned during production are not maintained and it seems wrong to us, for example, that the bonus for "hot work" may give no real benefit.

64. The Company told us that they were determined to do a thorough and radical review. This was started in approximately June, 1969. A detailed survey was begun at Ravenhead works by a special management team with the help of the Manchester Business School. It was expected that the preliminary work would take about a year. Events have, of course, overtaken this work. The Company's approach has three main weaknesses:

- (1) The review was planned on a far too leisurely time scale. It is easy to be wise after the event but there were so many points of friction that industrial relations considerations should have led to a speedier approach.
- (2) The work on the "Productivity Programme" was based on one works, Ravenhead. This appears too narrow. It illustrates the Company's desire to treat its factories as similarly as possible. This may prove to be a mistake and a more profitable approach may be to look at the situation factory by factory, taking into account differences in size and process.
- (3) Although care was taken to inform the workers of the "Productivity Programme" as it was called it is regrettable that no dialogue was undertaken with the Union. Indeed the Company could put before us four general principles pervading their approach. These had never been put to the Union and it is by no means sure that they would all be acceptable. The Company's intention to involve the Union after the preliminary inquiry is leaving participation too late.

## *(ii) The Company's Industrial Relations and Personnel Organisation*

65. We questioned the Company about this and we were given a chart representing the present position. Whatever the day-to-day effect of the structure may be we cannot judge but the structure did not seem to us clear nor the responsibilities well defined. There seems to be the need for review and revision. There would be an advantage in looking at both industrial relations and personnel work. These aspects of management benefit from fairly close integration.

66. There should be a clearly defined chain of command. It should be firmly based at factory level. Each factory should have the necessary specialists. Every works manager should have industrial relations and personnel advice readily available. A similar arrangement might also be established at the level of Divisional organisation. It would be relatively easy to integrate this type of structure with Company-wide specialists at the higher level.

67. It will be noted that these proposals dovetail with our thoughts on Union organisation. To facilitate this it is essential that the Company's industrial relations structure is geared to operate at all levels. A manager, whatever his level, should have a clear idea of the personnel and industrial relations aspects of his job. He must be provided with help on problems as they arise or can be anticipated, if only to avoid undue delay and relatively simple problems having to be referred elsewhere.

## *(iii) The Organisation of the Union*

68. Our hope is that one of the results of this inquiry will be greater participation of individual workers, through their Union, at all levels. The Union cannot escape criticism for its organisation and attitudes prior to this dispute. It would be fair to emphasise the background against which the weaknesses have grown. There has been a long and honourable history of industrial and general relations between the Company and the Union. There are many milestones in this relationship—a pioneer JIC for example and an understanding that all JIC workers should join the Union. The very tranquillity engendered by these good relations might perhaps have in part led to the weaknesses.

69. We heard considerable criticism of the way the Union was run. It will be recalled that the JIC workers in St. Helens are members of Branch 91. This branch falls within the North Wales, North West and Northern Ireland District of the Union. The District Office is in Liverpool. The branch has a full-time Secretary and an ample number of shop stewards—a total of about 120 or one, we were told, for every 53 workers or so. A fair proportion of these shop stewards have had some training by the Union.

70. A symptom of the unease is the doubt which was expressed about the exact status of the monthly branch meeting. This was attended by shop stewards and was theoretically open to other members. But there seemed to be an impression or attitude which led politically active lay members of the Union to feel that they would not be welcome at such meetings. This may well have been a mistaken attitude and those who expressed it to us do not seem to have done much to test or dispel it. Nonetheless, we feel that more should have been done to encourage active unionism.

71. The Union has set up a strong committee to review its structure. Quite rightly it feels that this is a domestic matter for itself but we feel that we can make a few suggestions that may be helpful. It seems to us that the concept of the branch is too modest for the work force involved. We feel that St. Helens should have a central union branch and that each factory should be organised as a branch, with officials elected by all GMWU members working in the factory and with a committee of elected representatives from all the departments within the factory. This suggestion will be seen to be in accord with our recommendations both on the Company's Industrial Relations structure and on joint negotiating procedures where we urge the Company to pay greater attention to each factory as a unit. Once the Union is organised in this way it should be easy to encourage regular fortnightly or monthly branch meetings, on a fixed and well-known day, with a central structure to co-ordinate the factories and the National Officer to co-ordinate glass workers generally.

#### (iv) *Negotiating Procedures*

72. The JIC may be regarded as a pioneer in the field of joint consultation and negotiation. Its history stretches back over 50 years. Yet it has clearly shown itself ineffective, not in failing to stop the dispute once it had started, but in avoiding the underlying causes which fell within its purview.

73. The great need is for an effective "substructure" so that workshop opinion can be brought to general notice as soon as possible. We have in mind a more integrated structure. There is a clear need for a formal structure at individual works level. This could be used both as consultative and negotiating machinery so that both sides see the overall picture of problems and difficulties; solutions and awards. The area of negotiation and consultation should be clearly defined. If the Company accepts what we say about the wages structure—that more emphasis should be given to works differences, then such a substructure appears natural and essential. It would also involve a two-way flow of proposals and ideas improving considerably efficiency and communications.

74. We would go a stage further and recommend consideration of an informal body to operate at departmental level in the larger departments. Here the purpose would be consultative but ideas and proposals could be fed into the formal machinery at works level. We do not feel that the present works consultative committees at Fibreglass and Eccleston works provided the right answer.

75. The settlement of 20th April proposed a working party in negotiating procedures. A restructuring here is obviously of primary importance. It is interesting to note that both Union and Company recognised that this was a task to be tackled before this dispute arose just as the weaknesses of the wages structure were well known and even talked about. There needs to be a new sense of urgency in tackling jointly the many problems that have now been highlighted and it is essential that this determination to anticipate and tackle problems should be carried forward into the new machinery.

### **Conclusions**

76. There are three areas which need firm action. The most urgent need is to heal the wounds which this bitter and violent industrial trouble has left.

The greatest damage has been done to the relationship between the GMWU and a considerable and vocal body of its members. These members have rightly pointed out Union weaknesses. They do not, however, yet appear to have accepted the positive duties of the critic. It is their duty, as much as it is their right, to play a full part in a revitalisation of the Union in St. Helens. Personalities must be forgotten, because the areas of disagreement are very small. A sound, active Union structure should be created and supported by everyone. Those who feel strongly about past failings must be willing to work for the Union structure and activity they desire. The time has passed for the use of individual weaknesses to mount criticism of the Union: the time has come for constructive discussion with the Union. The opportunity is there. The Union has promised a full review of its structure in St. Helens and has nominated a strong committee to undertake this. Changes are inevitable and they are bound to lead to a greater opportunity for participation. The good faith of those who have been in dispute with their own Union will be tested. If they take the opportunities Union strength will be enhanced. If they persist in criticism of their Union they will create a continuing situation of strife.

77. The Union itself needs to show its willingness to change is no mere facade. Two needs stand out. There must be an organisation in St. Helens which is based in each factory and which allows the free flow of views and opinions in both directions. This organisation must be carefully ordered so that every individual Union member is encouraged to take an interest and is able to take an active part if he so wishes. Worker dissatisfaction must be processed quickly and firmly through Union channels whenever it arises. The Union must be less ready to accept the Company dictated pace of reform and change whenever it feels its members' interests are at stake.

78. The Company itself has agreed that it needs a fairly radical change in outlook. There was a measure of paternalism about its approach which has led to the growth over the years of a somewhat slow and indeterminate approach to industrial relations. There must be a willingness to discuss the principles of change and when these are agreed to press forward with investigation of feasibility and implementation as quickly as possible. A clear two-way channel of communication must be built not only vertically through the Company but horizontally with the appropriate Union official, particularly at factory level. We are not sure that the Company, when it was talking to us, fully appreciated these problems. Their solution is essential.

79. Finally it is important to stress that the trouble at St. Helens has grown over the last few years and so is in a sense deep seated. But it would be wrong to overstress it. By the time they came to give evidence before us, all, the unofficial strikers, the Union and the Company, realised the problems in outline at least. All were prepared to do something about them. The atmosphere was potentially a good one for the areas of difference were small.

80. The result of this strike and the way it was conducted meant a great deal of violence and ill-feeling was created in St. Helens. St. Helens is a town noted for its dependence upon the prosperity brought by Pilkingtons and there is no doubt that considerable harm has been done. Everyone must work for a return to the former spirit which can only be created if faults which broke it down are remedied. The Company must revise its industrial relations and look urgently at its pattern of wage rates. The Union must revitalise its

St. Helens' structure and ensure that shop floor workers play the part they wish in Union activities. Above all the situation in which Union members set themselves against the Union must end and the energies of those who disapprove of past practices by the Union must be bent to see that they play a full part in the Union so that what they criticise is not allowed to arise again. Only in this way can a situation of continued bad feeling and unrest be avoided.

81. We would not wish to complete our Report without recording our appreciation of the great help we have had from our Secretary, Mr. G. R. Fisher, and his assistant, Mr. M. R. Hanson.

We have the honour to be,

Your obedient servants,

J. C. WOOD

M. J. M. CLARKE

J. GORMLEY

G. R. FISHER (*Secretary*)

M. R. HANSON (*Assistant Secretary*)

10th June, 1970



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